抽象的

Corporate governance, managers’self-interest and corporate herd behavior of investment- empirical research of Chinese listed companies

Hu Xiaoguang

In this paper, the listed companies in China from 2009 to 2013 were considered as a sample,the fact whether managers self-interested motives lead to herd behavior was analyzed and the inhibitory effect exerting on herd behavior caused by companies’governance mechanism was examined. The studied results demonstrated that there is more obvious in herd investment behavior of listed companies in China. In the companies’governance mechanism, the shareholder control, managerial can effectively control non-flock investment behavior and the inhibition of independent directors is not obvious. The conclusion drawn in this paper not only supports the assumption of that herd behavior is sourced from managers’ self-interest motivation, but also help us to recognizethe corporate governance mechanism must be effective in the perfect market environment